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Abstract—In many applications, wireless sen-
sor networks need to secure information. Actual
researchs found efficient solutions for this kind
of network, principally by using cryptography to
secure the data transfer. However an encrypted in-
formation send by the network can be sufficient to
prevent an attacker, who eavesdrops the network,
that something important has been detected. To
avoid this situation, we propose another way to
secure wireless sensor networks by using steganog-
raphy, specifically by hiding data in the MAC layer
of the 802.15.4 protocol. We show that this solution
can be an energy-efficient way with a good latency
to hide data in a wireless sensor network.
Index Terms—wireless sensor networks,
steganography, security, 802.15.4 protocol, MAC
layer, hidden data
I. Introduction
Steganography is an old technique that has existed
since antiquity. Herodotus, a Greek historian who
lived in the 5th century B.C., relates how the Greeks
sent and received warnings of enemy movements
using a message underneath the wax of a writing
tablet. Other examples were the use of secret ink
to hide information on a white paper or the use of
micro-dot by intelligence agencies in World War 2.
The word steganography comes etymologically from
the Greek words Stegano, meaning I cover, and
Graphô, meaning I write, and is literally cover what I
write - or more simply, hide data. If cryptography is to
encrypt and render a data unreadable, steganography
is the way to hide the existence of this data.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to secure
a wireless sensor network, to use steganographic tech-
niques to hide the existence of data in the 802.15.4
protocol. This protocol is a protocol widely used in
wireless sensor networks. This protocol specifies the
PHY and MAC layers of communication, because it
provides an energy-efficient solution for communica-
tion between wireless sensors. Zigbee [1], the most
used protocol in wireless sensor networks, uses this
802.15.4 protocol for the communication layer. We
explain in this article how we can use the MAC
layer fields of 802.15.4 protocol to hide data in the
network and create a steganographic channel. By
using steganographic methods, this data becomes
undetectable in the wireless sensor network if this
steganographic method is unknown by an attacker.
In Section 2 of this paper, we present previous work
on steganography and specifically in communication
protocols. In Section 3, we show different possibilities
of hiding data in wireless sensor networks by using
MAC layer fields of the 802.15.4 protocol. In Section
4, we describe an experiment of steganography in
wireless sensor networks that we made with telosB
sensors. In Section 5, we show our experimental results
of simulations with AvroraZ by comparing energy
consumption and latency of steganography in MAC
layer of 802.15.4 protocol and cryptography. In Section
6, we discuss about our future works and we conclude.
II. Related work
The aim of steganography consists of embedding
data (text, movie, picture, etc...) called the secret
message, in another media or support [2]. The support
where the data is hidden is named the cover object.
Once the secret message is embedded in the cover mes-
sage, the result is called a stego object. For example,
we can hide a picture in another picture, and in this
latter picture, we cannot see that the first picture is
hidden inside.
When we speak about steganography, we refer to the
analogy of Alice and Bob [3]. Alice and Bob are in
jail and are monitored by a warden, Wendy. If Alice
wants to send a message to Bob, this message must
go through Wendy. If Wendy sees that the message
contains an important message (for example the hour
of an escape), Wendy will never give the message
2to Bob. Therefore, Alice should find a way to hide
information in the message without Wendy seeing it.
For example, Alice will hide a message in another
message. If we read every other letter, we can read the
hidden message; but if Wendy reads this message, she
will not see the hidden message. In steganography, this
example shows that the steganographic method must
be kept secret (if Wendy knows the steganographic
technique, she can read the message) and all partic-
ipants who want to communicate should know this
method to hide and to read the data.
A lot of steganographic techniques exist [3], but
the most important goal of actual research work in
steganography is to hide pictures in an other picture.
These techniques have given birth to watermarking
[4], which consists of watermarking a picture to add
data. For example, watermarking can be used to add
the name of a patient or private information to a
medical picture (scanner, radiography, MRI).
Several steganographic techniques aim to use specifici-
ties of communication protocols to hide data and use
communication layer fields as the cover object. This
use of steganographic data in communication layer
fields provides the creation of a hidden channel in the
network. Only devices that know in which fields the
data is hidden can read data or write data. They can
invisibly exchange data in the network if the network
does not know the steganographic technique.
[5], [6] and [7] show different possibilities for hiding
data by using specificities of protocol to create a
hidden channel (steganographic channel). The most
used techniques consist of using the reserved field of
the protocol. Thus, [5] uses the reserved field in the
TCP packet header of the TCP/IP protocol, as we
can see in Figure 1, and gives the possibility to hide
six bits per exchanged packet in this example.
Fig. 1. Reserved bytes in TCP Packet Header
This technique can also be used to create a hidden
channel in a wireless local area network as explained
in [8]. This example is closer to what we can do
in wireless sensor networks if we try to apply this
method in the 802.15.4 protocol.
In wireless sensor networks, the use of steganography
has been first mentioned in [9], with the conclusion
that it would be difficult to apply it in wireless sensor
networks, because they are constrained by their
limited energy and their low-power computing, and
because steganography is more applied with picture
or video. However [10] and [11] show possibilities
using noise in the physical layer of the 802.15.4
protocol to hide data and create a steganographic
channel. If these examples are known possibilities
for using the 802.15.4 protocol to hide data, and
show that steganography is a new way of research in
wireless sensor network, to the best of our knowledge
[12], we do not know of an example of steganography
using communication of MAC layer fields in the
802.15.4 protocol.
III. Hiding data in MAC IEEE 802.15.4
In this section, we show the possibility of hiding
data in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol.
Frames in the MAC layer of the 802.15.4 protocol are
different and depend on the kind of packet sent. The
MAC layer uses 4 different kinds of frames:
1) - Data frame
2) - Beacon frame
3) - Acknowledgment frame
4) - MAC command frame
We will discuss ways to hide data in these different
kinds of frames.
A. Data frame
The general structure of a MAC data frame can be
seen in Figure 2. This structure can be found in [13].
Fig. 2. MAC data frame structure
In this frame, the Frame Control field, Data
Sequence Number field, and Address Information
field provide possibilities to hide information.
1) Frame control field: The Frame Control field is
represented by Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Frame control field structure
We can see that the 7-9th bits and the 12-13th bits
are reserved and can be used to hide a stego object.
Here, we can encode three and two bits, respectively,
in these fields.
32) Sequence Number field: The Sequence Number
field contains the numbering of each packet on 8 bits,
used in particular with packet acknowledgements to
specify which packet has been acknowledged. The
value of this number corresponds to the PIB macDSN
variable. This variable is initialized randomly, then
incremented after each received packet.
If we choose this initialized number of the PIB
variable, we can hide a stego object (or a part of the
stego object) inside. We can hide up to one byte of
data in this field.
3) Address Info field: The Address Info field is
represented in Figure 4. Its size varies between four
and 20 bytes.
Fig. 4. Address Info field structure
The Source Address field is interesting, because we
can choose to have a short (16 bits) or an extended
source address (64 bits). It is possible to hide data
in this field, for example, if we specify a nonexistent
source address. With this nonexistent address, we
can hide a stego object with a size up to 64 bits.
This steganographic technique can be particularly
undetectable if the network does not know the exact
number of nodes present in the network, especially in
a big network where nodes can be added over time.
B. Beacon frame
The general structure of a MAC Beacon frame can
be seen in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Beacon frame structure
We find the same possibilities for hiding information
as in the Data Frame, in the Frame Control and
in the Source Address Information field. However, in
the Beacon Frame, the source address information is
limited to 10 bytes; yet the Beacon Sequence Number
field give us another way to use the cover object.
The Beacon Sequence Number field contains the se-
quence number of the Beacon node. This number
is given by the macBSN variable. This variable is
ordinarily initialized randomly. As in the Sequence
Number field of the MAC data frame, we can volun-
tarily choose the value of this number and then hide
up to one byte of data.
C. Acknowledgement frame
The general structure of an Acknowledgement frame
can be seen in figure 6.
Fig. 6. Acknowledgement frame structure
We find the same possibilities for hiding data in the
Frame Control field and Data Sequence Number field.
Both are identical to fields of the MAC data frame.
D. Command frame
The general structure of a command frame can be
seen in figure 7.
Fig. 7. Command frame structure
Here, we can see that the Frame Control, Data
Sequence Number and Address Information fields
provide the same possibilities of hiding data in the
command frame as in the MAC data frame.
IV. Experimentation
A. Our proposition
The aim of our proposition to use steganographic
methods is to propose a energy-efficient solution to
hide information and answer to the example of Alice,
Bob and Wendy applied in wireless sensor networks:
where Alice and Bob would be two sensors, and Wendy
would be another sensor or a device of an attacker
that listens to network communications. If Wendy sees
that an encrypted message is sent by Alice to Bob, she
can think that an important information is hidden in
this message. In the case of a network that detects
intrusions or a wireless sensor network that sends data
about troop’s positions for a military application, to
see an encrypted message can be sufficient to know if
the network has detected something or to know where
troops move. To counter this problem, we propose
that sensors of the network, that detect important in-
formation, send unimportant information in the data
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critical data in MAC layer fields of the 802.15.4. As we
saw in the previous section, the MAC layer provide us
a lot of possibilities for cover objects. there are other
possibilities for hiding data in the 802.15.4, but we
have chosen to present the most significant parts.
If we take the example of a sent MAC data frame,
we can hide in the different fields that we have seen
previously :
1) 3 + 2 = 5 bits for the frame control field
2) 8 bits for the data sequence number field
3) 64 bits for the address info field
...making a total of 77 hidden bits. This number of bits
is enough to exchange one or more stego messages, as
a GPS position, a temperature or just a code.
In our threat model, we assume that the attacker does
not know these steganographic possibilities and that
for the attacker an encrypted data is more important
than an unencrypted data.
B. Implementation
To prove the feasibility of using steganography in
MAC layer fields of 802.15.4 protocol, we implement
a program on telosB sensors in TinyOS 2.x using the
tkn154 library [14], that provides to modify MAC
layer fields of 802.15.4 protocol. For our experiment
we use 3 telosB sensors:
• a sender, that detects information and sends it
with steganography
• an intermediate that makes the relay between the
sender and the receiver
• a receiver connected to a computer that displays
steganographic data recorded in MAC Layer.
The program of the sender sensor records temperature
data that it sends to the intermediate all seconds in a
different steganographic field (macDSN field or Source
Address field) of the MAC layer of a Data Frame. Our
results show that for 100 records, all data have been
transmitted using steganography from the sender to
the receiver without any loss.
V. Experimental Results
We use AvroraZ [15] for our simulation. Avroraz is
a specific version of the Avrora simulator [16] for wire-
less sensor network, that includes simulation of MAC
layer of 802.15.4 for micaZ sensors. This simulator give
us the opportunity to record execution time and en-
ergy consumption of our proposition. Following tables
and figures show results of the simulation, where we
hide data in the MAC layer fields of MAC Data Frame
of 802.15.4 protocol. We call here StegoMacDSN,
Method (Bits
hidden/encrypted)
Number
of CPU
Cycle
Execution
time
(µsec)
Energy
Con-
sumption
(µJoule)
StegoMacDSN
(8) 60 8.14 0.1031
StegoShortAddress
(16) 108 14.65 0.1855
StegoExtendedAddress
(64) 112 15.19 0.1924
StegoAllField
(77) 178 24.14 0.2955
AES 128
(1 to 128) 3843125 521257.19 6604.4328
TABLE I
Number of CPU cycles, execution time and energy
consumption results on micaZ
StegoShortAddress, StegoExtendedAddress and Ste-
goAllFields, respectively the fact to hide data in the
macDSN field, the Short Address Source field, the
Extended Address Source field and the combination
of the macDSN, the Extended Address Source and
reserved bits fields. We compare our steganographic
solutions with the symetric encryption algorithm AES
128 used in wireless sensor network, principaly with
the secure protocol TinySEC [19]. Results are showed
in the table 1.
Obviously we can see that executions of our
steganographic solutions are extremly quicker than
cryptography and energy-efficient.
Fig. 8. Energy consumption to hide and send a stego message
on micaZ
The figure 8 shows the energy consumption to hide
and send a stego message, depending on the data
size of this message. We can see that even the worst
solution StegoMacDSN, which consists to only use the
macDSN layer and to send a packet for each 8 bits,
costs less energy to do than encrypt this message with
AES 128.
5Fig. 9. Time execution to hide and send a stego message on
micaZ
The figure 9 shows the execution time necessary to
hide and send a stego message, depending on the data
size of the message. Results show that the solution
of steganography in wireless sensor network can be
adapted for reactive application, even if the size of
cover objects are shorts.
In conclusion, results of simulation proove that
steganography in the Mac layer of 802.15.4 protocol
give us new energy-efficient possibilities to hide data
with a good latency in wireless sensor networks.
VI. Future Work and Conclusion
Our proposition to hide information in MAC Layer
of 802.15.4 protocol, is a pure steganographic solution.
It means that the secret is where the data is hidden,
but obviously if an attacker know this secret, he is
able to read the message. This is why, after showing
that steganography is possible in 802.15.4 protocol,
we want next to implement secret key and public key
steganography to enforce the security. Our final aim is
to implement a steganographic method in the 802.15.4
protocol that resists to steganalysis.
However we show in this paper that it is possible
to use steganography to hide information in the MAC
layer of the 802.15.4 protocol. We have implemented
this solution on TelosB sensor and simulate their
energy-consumption and their latency with Avroraz.
Our final results show that steganography in 802.15.4
protocol provides an energy-efficient solution with a
low latency to secure and to hide data in wireless
sensor networks.
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